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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: REFLECTIONS
ON THE 1994 OCTOBER TERM*
Janet Koven Levitt
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment decisions from this past term have not
presented the same drama as the Court's decisions on race,' church/
state,2 the Commerce Clause,3 and federalism.4 This lack of drama is
not mere fortuity. Many Fourth Amendment rights that were be-
stowed upon criminal defendants during the early Warren Court
years5 were abruptly diluted by the Burger Court.' The Rehnquist
Court, therefore, is left to tinker around the edges of what is already a
rather constricted Fourth Amendment. I would characterize its con-
tribution to the criminal procedure field as a second generation re-
trenchment that is dwarfed in both substance and drama by the first
generation retrenchment that took place during the Burger Court
years.
The Rehnquist Court nonetheless continues to define the con-
tours of the Fourth Amendment. The overall picture is one of a
Fourth Amendment that is further disintegrating with every passing
term. The 1994 October Term is no exception to this rule.
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994
Supreme Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, November 17, 1995.
t Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law; A.B., 1990, Princeton
University; M.A., 1994, Yale University; J.D, 1994, Yale Law School.
1. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
2. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors to the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
3. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
4. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
5. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is rooted
in an attendant Fourth Amendment violation).
6. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (carving out the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,223 (1983) (delinking the exclusionary rule
from the Fourth Amendment violation). See generally Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and
Criminal Justice, 31 TuLSA LJ. 1 (1995).
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In general, there are two ways to curtail Fourth Amendment
rights. First, by constraining the reach of the exclusionary rule, Fourth
Amendment violations will not find effective remedies in courts of
law. The exclusionary rule vindicates Fourth Amendment violations
by making fruits of unconstitutional searches or seizures inadmissible.
The Court has persistently carved out exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, the most notable being United States v. Leon's good faith excep-
tion.7 By expanding existing exceptions or carving out additional ex-
ceptions, the Court narrows the scope of the exclusionary rule and
blunts the impact of a Fourth Amendment violation. Second, the
Court can expand notions of reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment
proscribes only unreasonable searches and seizures.8 By expanding
what it deems a reasonable search and seizure, the Court can narrow
the reach of the Fourth Amendment. During the 1994 October Term,
the Court demonstrated its aptitude in using both of these methods,
and the result will be further erosion of the Fourth Amendment.
II. ARIZONA V. EvAN 9
In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court narrowed the exclusion-
ary rule by expanding the good faith exception to that rule. In Evans,
the defendant was driving the wrong way down a one-way street.' 0
Unfortunately for the defendant, he was driving in front of the police
station,1 and the police legitimately stopped Mr. Evans for his traffic
offense.' During the stop, the police examined his driver's license
and entered his name into a computer,' 3 actions which are perfectly
legitimate in the wake of a traffic stop.' 4 The officer's computer re-
vealed that the defendant's license had been suspended and that there
was an outstanding warrant for his arrest because the defendant had
"failed to appear to answer for several traffic offenses."15 Because
there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest, the police
7. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 ("We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced
by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invali-
dated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.").
8. U.S. CONSr. amend. IV.
9. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).




14. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (permitting license checks following legitimate traffic
stops).
15. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
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officers arrested him. While being handcuffed, the defendant dropped
a marijuana cigarette, which lead to a search.16 During this search, the
officers found marijuana on the defendant's body and in his car. The
state then charged him with possession of marijuana.' 7
Until this point, the encounter was perfectly legitimate - the ini-
tial computer search, the arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant,
the search pursuant to the arrest, and the arrest for possession of ma-
rijuana constituted legitimate manifestations of the state's police
power. The catch, the issue that transformed this case into one that
warranted Supreme Court review, was that the computer record con-
tained an error. Although the computer showed an outstanding war-
rant for his arrest, the arrest warrant had actually been quashed
seventeen days earlier.' 8 Mr. Evans' initial arrest was patently uncon-
stitutional because it was rooted in a substantively invalid arrest war-
rant. Concomitantly, the search that led to the discovery of the
marijuana cigarette was unconstitutional because it stemmed from an
unconstitutional arrest. 9 The trial court never attributed blame for
the computer error, and it is unclear whether the error was the fault of
court employees or sheriff's department personnel.2 °
The question that percolated through the Arizona state courts
and eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether
the exclusionary rule mandated suppression of the fruits of an uncon-
stitutional search conducted pursuant to a non-existent arrest warrant
that appeared on a faulty computer entry. The state trial court
granted the motion to suppress,2 ' the appellate court reversed,22 and
the Arizona Supreme Court reversed again, thereby upholding the
16. Id. For cases addressing search incident to arrest, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
460 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
17. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
18. id.
19. The state conceded that because the warrant had been quashed, and therefore the de-
fendant was arrested and searched pursuant to a non-existent warrant, the search violated the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1189 n.1.
20. Id. at 1188.
21. Id. (The trial court found that the facts supported inferences that could peg the error
either with law enforcement personnel or court employees, but concluded that the precise source
of the error was irrelevant to its decision to suppress the evidence pursuant to the exclusionary
rule).
22. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Ariz. 1992) (Implicitly assuming that the error
resulted from court personnel, a divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the trial court's decision, stating, "the exclusionary rule [was] not intended to deter
justice court employees or Sheriff's Office employees who are not directly associated with the
arresting officers or the arresting officers' police department.").
1996]
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trial court's decision to grant the motion to suppress.23 The U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the following question: Does the
exclusionary rule require "suppression of evidence seized incident to
an arrest resulting from an inaccurate computer record, regardless of
whether police personnel or court personnel were responsible for the
record's continued presence in the police computer?" 24
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a seven-to-two decision that was
joined by all of his colleagues except for Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Stevens, held that the exclusionary rule should not apply.25 First, the
Court reaffirmed the position taken in its previous opinions, 26 holding
that the Fourth Amendment contains no provision precluding the use
of evidence and that the mere fact that the state conceded a Fourth
Amendment violation did not mandate use of the exclusionary rule.2 7
Establishing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and exclusionary
rule jurisprudence were not necessarily coterminous, the Court then
held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable in this case.28
In so holding, the Court purported to squarely apply United States
v. Leon.29 As already mentioned, I would characterize Leon as one of
the hallmark retrenchment cases of the Burger Court era.30 Leon
dealt with a search and subsequent seizure of evidence on the basis of
a facially valid warrant which a magistrate later found invalid because
it did not satisfy the probable cause requirement.3' In holding that the
exclusionary rule should not apply to effect suppression of the evi-
dence which was discovered during the search, the Court carved out a
major exception to the exclusionary rule - the good faith exception. 32
The Court in Leon held that evidence seized by an officer relying on a
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate should not be
suppressed through the exclusionary rule because such reliance made
the officer's actions objectively reasonable.33 Leon further held that
23. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871-72 (Ariz. 1994) (discarding the court of appeals' as-
sumption that court employees, rather than law enforcement personnel, were responsible for the
error and holding that the deterrent ends of the exclusionary rule would be served regardless of
the source of the error).
24. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189.
25. Id. at 1195.
26. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974)).
27. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1191.
28. Id. at 1193.
29. Id. at 1194.
30. See supra text accompanying note 6.
31. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902.
32. Id. at 918.
33. Id. at 926.
[Vol. 31:473
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suppression on the basis of such objectively reasonable conduct would
not advance the exclusionary rule's deterrent ends and therefore was
inappropriate.34
In Arizona v. Evans, the Court reasoned that the officers' behav-
ior in arresting the defendant was objectively reasonable because they
relied on a computer record of an arrest warrant, regardless of
whether the record was in fact substantively accurate.35 Because ob-
jectively reasonable conduct cannot be deterred through suppression
of evidence and because deterrence is the underlying rationale of the
exclusionary rule, the Court reasoned that Evans was not a case where
the exclusionary rule should apply.36 Relying on Leon, the Evans
Court concluded that when the police act in good faith, in objectively
reasonable reliance on a computer record, the deterrent ends of the
exclusionary rule are not furthered in any appreciable way.
This case is significant for several reasons. The first is institu-
tional. Although the Court has encountered cases dealing with the
Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule throughout the last dec-
ade, this is the first major exclusionary rule case since Leon, and at
that time only three current Justices - Chief Justice Rehnquist, Jus-
tice O'Connor, and Justice Stevens - were sitting on the Court. Ev-
ans serves as a resounding reaffirmation of the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule and thereby a resounding reaffirmation of the
Burger Court's first generation retrenchment. It is also an indication
that the current Court is willing to tinker with the Burger Court's ma-
jor doctrinal shifts - in this case the staking out of a good faith excep-
tion - to embellish, expand, and fortify those doctrines.
Second, and even more significant, Evans greatly expanded the
scope of the good faith exception, further narrowing the exclusionary
rule's applicability. On the surface, Evans carves out another cate-
gory of conduct that can satisfy the good faith exception - objectively
reasonable reliance on computer records of arrest warrants. Thus,
one pragmatic result of this case is that computer error, regardless of
whether it was the fault of court or police personnel, will now benefit
the police, and law enforcement agencies will have no incentive to
keep their records up to date because careless reporting in essence
provides the police with more authority to conduct searches.37 This is
34. Id. at 918.
35. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194.
36. Id. at 1191 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 and Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987)).
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a particularly disturbing development given the likelihood that even
the smallest police departments increasingly rely on computer data
bases for information concerning warrants and outstanding charges.3
I would argue, however, that the significance of this case tran-
scends this ostensible catagorical expansion of the exclusionary rule.
The Court, which purported to apply squarely Leon's good faith ex-
ception, in reality broadened its underpinnings and thereby unleashed
an accordion-like expansion of the good faith exception. Leon was
premised on the synergy of two factors. The first was that objectively
reasonable police conduct could not be deterred through the exclu-
sionary rule.39 The second was that reliance on the detached and neu-
tral scrutiny of a magistrate constitutes objectively reasonable, and
therefore non-deterrable, conduct.4 0 Whereas the sequence of events
in Leon was issuance of search warrant, execution of warrant, and
quashing of warrant,4' the sequence in Evans was issuance of arrest
warrant, quashing of warrant, and then execution of warrant. In Ev-
ans, a detached and neutral magistrate decided in a detached and neu-
tral way that an arrest warrant should be quashed prior to execution
of that warrant. Using the reasoning of Leon, it is this detached, neu-
tral judgment that should be determinative of the objective reasona-
bleness of the arresting officer's behavior. In Evans, however, the
Court applied the good faith exception despite the officer's reliance
on an invalid warrant rather than because of the officer's reliance on a
valid warrant. The Court looked only to the superficial validity of the
warrant, determined that the officers could not have known the war-
rant had been previously quashed, and ruled the conduct in good faith
and the evidence not subject to suppression. Thus, objective reasona-
bleness has been delinked from the detached and neutral judgment of
38. Id.; see also State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869,872 (Ariz. 1994). The Arizona Supreme Court
stated:
It is repugnant to the principles of a free society that a person should ever be taken into
police custody because of a computer error precipitated by government carelessness.
As automation increasingly invades modem life, the potential for Orwellian mischief
grows. Under such circumstances, the exclusionary rule is a cost we cannot afford to be
without.
Id.
39. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19.
40. See id. at 913-15, 922 (Because judges, magistrates, or court personnel, unlike the police,
have no stake in the outcome of the case there is no reason to believe that they attempt to ignore
or subvert the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, reliance on their decisions - even a warrant that
is subsequently determined to be without probable case - is objectively reasonable).
41. Id. at 902-03.
[Vol. 31:473
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a magistrate. The synergy we observed in Leon between the deter-
rence rationale and the detached and neutral magistrate's issuance of
a warrant has been broken, and deterrence is the sole arbiter of the
good faith exception.
What does this mean for practitioners? In answering this ques-
tion, it is significant that the courts never determined whether court
employees or police department personnel were responsible for the
faulty computer record.42 While the source of the computer error be-
came a significant issue in the state courts4 3 the U.S. Supreme Court
assumed that responsibility for the error had not been ascertained but
nonetheless pursued its analysis because, presumably, the source was
irrelevant to the legal issues at hand. Given the factual record that the
Court accepted, it is very possible that police department personnel
were responsible for the computer error. So when we hear about an
exclusionary rule that is designed to combat and deter police miscon-
duct,44 it appears that deterrence is geared only toward police in the
field who are making arrests and that police department personnel are
not among those targeted for deterrence. Evans thereby narrowed
the type of state action and the class of state actors that are suscepti-
ble to the exclusionary rule.
When we juxtapose the fact that deterrence remains the sole arbi-
ter of the good faith exception with the fact that deterrence is only
aimed at police officers in the field, the ramifications are potentially
far reaching. The good faith exception could logically be utilized in
situations where no warrant was ever issued. 45 "For example, if the
police believed in good faith that a warrant or authorization was is-
sued, based on information from a court clerk, a judge advocate, or
other nonpolice personnel, the subsequent search may be justified
42. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1189 (1995) ("grant[ing] certiorari to determine
whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to an arrest re-
sulting from an inaccurate computer record, regardless of whether police personnel or court
personnel were responsible for the record's continued presence in the police computer."); State
v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 870 (Ariz. 1994) ("At the suppression hearing, there was conflicting
evidence concerning" who was at fault for the computer error).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
44. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1987).
45. Maj. Masterton, A New Expansion of the Good Faith Exception: Arizona v. Evans,
ARMy LAW., July 1995, at 56, 57 ("the trial judge suppressed the evidence seized during the
arrest without making any finding whether the court personnel or police personnel were respon-
sible for the error.").
1996]
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under the good faith exception, even though no warrant or authoriza-
tion ever existed. '46 In other words, a police officer's conduct is ob-
jectively reasonable, and thereby protected by the good faith
exception, not only through reliance on a judicial determination of
probable cause, but also through reliance on other types of court
records and written or oral information from court or police person-
nel. Through such fortification of the good faith exception, the Court
in Evans further limited the scope of the exclusionary rule and, con-
comitantly, reduced the likelihood that undisputed Fourth Amend-
ment violations will find effective remedies in courts.
III. VERNoNIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J v. A CTON
Through Evans, the Court demonstrated that it could constrict
Fourth Amendment rights by further limiting the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,47 however, the
Court demonstrated its agility in deflating Fourth Amendment rights
through expanding notions of reasonableness. Acton involved a chal-
lenge to a suspicionless drug testing program in a high school. The
high school district in question instituted random drug testing of all
student athletes involved in any type of school-sponsored athletic ac-
tivity.48 Justice Scalia, joined by a rather remarkable majority -
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer - held that drug testing of student ath-
letes absent particularized suspicion is reasonable under the rubric of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In concluding that the drug test-
ing program was a reasonable search, Justice Scalia balanced the stu-
dent's legitimate expectation of privacy, the severity of the intrusion
on individual privacy rights, and the nature of the government inter-
est.49 First, the Court held that students do not have and should not
have a great expectation of privacy once they enter school. 50 Second,
the Court held that the scope of the search, namely urine analysis, was
not overly intrusive because the students were permitted to extract
urine samples behind urinal doors.51 Third, skirting the issue of
46. Id. at 58.
47. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
48. The plaintiffs in Acton were parents of a student who refused to sign a consent-to-search
form. Id. at 2390.
49. Id. at 2391-94.
50. Id. at 2392.
51. Id. at 2393.
[Vol. 31:473
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whether the countervailing government interest needed to be compel-
ling or merely important, the Court concluded that the governmental
interest in combatting a perceived drug problem in the school was suf-
ficiently strong to justify the search.5" After balancing these three fac-
tors, the Court concluded that random drug testing of student athletes
without any individualized suspicion constituted a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.
Parenthetically, Justice O'Connor wrote a passionate, articulate,
and deeply historical dissent that, in my opinion, overshadows the ma-
jority opinion.53 Relying on the same cases as the majority,54 Justice
O'Connor underscores that it is truly the exception and not the rule to
allow searches absent individualized suspicion.55 She castigates the
majority because they do not acknowledge that their holding - that
individualized reasonable suspicion is not a necessary predicate to
highly intrusive searching of high school students - is an extraordi-
nary aberration from a steadfast rule deeply embedded in the Fourth
Amendment's history.
Acton is clearly significant for many young people. We have a
Supreme Court decision which states that high school athletes can
constitutionally be tested for drugs absent particularized suspicion.
But beyond the opinion's face value, Acton is important because it
raises, and leaves conspicuously unanswered, some very significant
questions. Does Acton allow expansion of drug testing to all students,
regardless of whether they are athletes? Justice Ginsburg wrote a
concurrence which addresses the potential slippery-slope expansion of
random drug testing to all students, and she explicitly states that she
joined the majority only in so far as it applies to student athletes.56 No
one joined her concurrence, which may indicate that there is a rather
strong majority that would argue that Acton supports as constitutional
random drug testing for all students in public schools.
Another question that this opinion leaves unanswered is the one
raised by Justice O'Connor in her dissent. Acton sanctioned as consti-
tutional a suspicionless and highly intrusive search. Will this effect a
52. ld. at 2396.
53. Id at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. See, eg., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Treasury Em-
ployees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Bell v.
wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
55. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
19961
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dissipation of the time-honored and historically embedded individual-
ized suspicion requirement? Will the Court's acceptance of suspi-
cionless drug testing in this special school setting be used as carte
blanche authority to extend suspicionless searches to other realms?
Or will it remain the exception, rather than the rule, to condone
Fourth Amendment searches absent particularized suspicion?
Finally, while it is unclear precisely how Acton is going to rever-
berate through the law, it is patently clear that the Court was willing
to discount and to devalue individual rights to privacy - in this case
by subjecting high school students to highly intrusive, yet suspi-
cionless, searches - in the name of a "higher" state interest. The
Court's willingness to discount individual privacy rights in Acton does
not bode well for the "right to privacy" questions that will inevitably
arise in future cases.
IV. WILSON V. ARKANSAS
Acton shows the Court's willingness to broadly define reasona-
bleness and thereby narrow its view of what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment violation. In passing, I would like to note an additional
case addressing the Court's conception of reasonableness. In Wilson
v. Arkansas,7 a unanimous opinion drafted by Justice Thomas, the
Court held that the common law "knock and announce" requirement
constitutes part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry,
but also held that it was not necessarily decisive of that inquiry. 8 The
Court then examined a search in which the police did not knock and
announce their presence before entering to execute a search warrant.
The Court reversed the state courts' denial of the motion to suppress
and remanded to the lower court for a determination of the reasona-
bleness of the search in light of the its holding regarding the constitu-
tional relevance of the "knock and announce" requirement.5 9
While the Court significantly broadened its conception of reason-
ableness in Acton by holding that suspicionless searches of student
athletes are reasonable, it potentially narrowed its conception of rea-
sonableness in Wilson v. Arkansas by mandating that courts consider
the "knock and announce" requirement when determining the reason-
ableness of a search. I believe that the Fourth Amendment ramifica-
tions of Acton, the rather pronounced magnification of what is
57. 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995).
58. Id. at 1916.
59. Id. at 1919.
[Vol. 31:473
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deemed a reasonable search and the potential dissipation of the time-
honored particularized suspicion requirement, are significantly more
profound than the holding in Wilson v. Arkansas, which merely man-
dates that the "knock and announce" requirement become an integral
consideration in determining the reasonableness of the execution of
search warrants. Nonetheless, Wilson v. Arkansas, illustrates that we
are not faced with a Court that is blindly reactive to Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness questions.
V. CONCLUSION
This past term illustrates that the Court is quite adept at reining
in Fourth Amendment rights. It understands how to manipulate the
exclusionary rule and how to expand notions of reasonableness to ef-
fect what I would characterize as a second generation retrenchment of
Fourth Amendment rights.
Looking into the future, the Fourth Amendment is not one of
those areas of constitutional law where the opinions rest on five-to-
four majorities. Instead, these opinions are supported by very strong
majorities. Six justices voted in favor of Evans and Acton. In addi-
tion, Justice Ginsburg was in the majority in Acton, and Justice
O'Connor voted with the majority in Evans. Justice Stevens remains
the lone protector of those more traditional Fourth Amendment rights
that were granted in the early Warren Court years. I predict, there-
fore, a solid majority behind a continuing erosion of Fourth Amend-
ment rights.
In closing I would like to suggest, however, that the most signifi-
cant case in the criminal law and criminal procedure realm may not be
a criminal law case at all but rather may be a case concerning the
Commerce Clause - United States v. Lopez.6" Many commentators
believe that Lopez is indicative of the Court's willingness to rein in
the Commerce Clause, which may negatively impact Congressional
ability to define new federal crimes. We therefore may see a halt, or
at least a slow down, in what has been a consistent trend over the last
several years - the federalization of the criminal law. The impact of
Lopez, however, is a subject for another panel, and I will leave a thor-
ough discussion of this case to Professor Schwartz, whose discussion is
presented in a subsequent article.
60. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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